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IN THE SUPREt1E COURT OF THE STl\TE OF U'l'l\H 
f 
'~RJORIE WINTERS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No. 15523 
vs. 
CHl\RLES ANTHONY, INC. , 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-l\ppellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE Cl\SE 
This is an action to recover the value of jewelry bailed to the 
defendant-appellant for the purpose of alteration. After the 
alterations were completed the jewelry was either lost or stolen througl 
the negligence of the appellant and has not been delivered to the 
respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The action was tried on September 29, 1977 before the Honorable 
Marcellus K. Snow, sitting without a jury. On October 18, 1977, 
judgment was entered in favor of respondent in the amount of eight 
thousand one hundred and eighty dollars ($8,180.00), together with 
interest and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant does not dispute the conclusion of the trial court 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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that appellant is liable to the respondent for the value of the 
jewelry under a contract of bailment. Appellant claims only that 
the trial court's damage award was excessive. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 23, 1976, respondent delivered to appellant's jewel: 
store in Trolley Square a bracelet given to her by her brother-~~ 
following her sister's death. The bracelet was of gold manufach~ 
and was set with 63 emeralds and 54 pearls. Respondent requested :I 
appellant to convert the bracelet into a cross to be worn as a penci 
or pin. 
On ahout April 15, 1976, after the altetations had been 
completed, appellant delivered the cross to H. J. Vander Veer, a 
well known Salt Lake City jewelry appraiser, to be appraised. 
vanC:er Veer, who had also seen the jewelry prior to the al terationo, 
examined the cross and rendered an appraisal concluding that t~ ~ 
contained 63 emeralds weighing a total of 18. 9 carats and 54 half 
pearls which, together with the setting, had a total retail market 
value of $8,180.00. 
When respondent returned to appellant's store in June, 1976 ~ 
pick up the cross and complete payment for the alterations, she wa; 
informed that the cross had been returned by Vander Veer, but was 
missing. The pendant was stolen or lost through the negligence of 
the appellant and has not been delivered to the respondent. 
The trial court held that the market value of the cross at trt 
time of the loss was $8,180.00 and entered judgment in favor of thi 
respondent in that amount, plus interest and costs. Appellant no',: 
- 2 -
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app~als claiming that the trial court's damage award is excessive. 
l\RGDr1EnT POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE 
OF DAMAGES IS THE Ml\RKET, OR REPLI\CEMENT, Vl\LUE OF THE JEWELRY 
AT THE TIME IT Wl\S LOS'l' AND A\vARDED THAT !\MOUNT TO RESPONDENT. 
Respondent does not dispute, and the trial court held, that the 
correct measure of damages in this case is the market, or replacement, 
value of the jewelry at the time it was lost through the negligence 
of the appellant. Clack-Nomah Flying Club v. Sterling Aircraft, Inc., 
Company, 121 U. 339, 241 P.2d, 914 (1952). 
The principle issue before this court is not whether the trial 
court should have adopted market value as the measure of damages, but 
whether the damage award was in excess of market value. In reviewing 
the award this court is governed by the following well-established 
principles set forth in Brown v. Board of Education of the Morgan 
County School District, 560 P.2d, 1129, 1131 (Utah 1977), quoting from 
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 U.2d 251, 495 P.2d 28, 29 (1972): 
On appeal the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable 
to sustain the lower court, and the findings will not be 
disturbed unless they are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence or it manifestly appears that the court misapplied 
the law to the established facts. 
Likewise, this court held in Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 P.2d 
751, 753 (Utah 1977), that the trial court's findings shall not be 
disturbed ". . unless the evidence is such that all reasonable 
minds would be persuaded to the contrary." Furthermore, it was held 
in Barlow Upholstery Furniture Company v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900, 902 
(Utah 1975) that where a finding of fact . .finds any reasonable 
support in the evidence it will not be disturbed on appeal. See also, 
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Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake Cit_z__C_OE!:J.OE'.:!!:i()_!:l_, 27 U.2d 188, ~ 
1283 (1972). 
There is ample evidence in the record in this case to supx 
the trial court's finding that the market value and replacement v 
of the jewelry at the time it was lost was $8,180.00. H • J. Vandc. 
the professional appraiser to whom appellant elected to take the 
bracelet for appraisal following its reconstruction into a cross~ 
customarily appraised jewelry for the appellant, testified that he, 
rendered a formal appraisal involving, inter alia, the measurement 
of the weight, dimensions, specific gravity and indices of refr~t"l 
of the stones mounted on the cross (T. 20-23). The appraisal cone: 
that the cross contained 6 3 gem-quality Muzo emeralds having a tot I 
weight of 18.9 carats and valued on the retail market at $400.00[1 
carat (T. 12, 19-21) and 54 half-pearls valued on the retail market 
at $5.00 each. Vander Veer testified that the retail market valucj 
I 
the whole piece was $8,180.00 (T.11) with a standard margin of err;~ 
of between 20 and 25 per cent (T.10). Vander Veer acknowledged th:, 
the wholesale price for the individual emeralds in the piece was 
approximately $200.00, and reaffirmed that his appraisal "is 
characterized as retail price" (T. 12) . Vander Veer explained why 
he appraised the cross at retail value, rather than wholesale value 
as follows at pages 12-13 of the trial transcript: 
Because an appraisal, when it is prepared, is, usually, fot 
an insurance company or for the party that wants to know di:: 
their item is worth. If it is used for the insurance puroo':, 
the insurance company would pay them as to their replacement 
value of the item, which would be the normal retail value; 
not the wholesale price." 
- 4 -
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Vander Veer teslified that the purpose of an appraisal is to place 
a retail value on an item (T.18); that he never appraises jewelry as 
to its who]csale value, but only as to its retail value; and that the 
retail value of the cross, as well as other jewelry he appraises, is 
arrived at Ly "keystoninq", or doubling, the wholesale price (T. 13-14). 
Ile stated that in his opinion the keystone figure, or marked-up value, 
represents the retail value of the cross (T. 17). He also stated 
that his appraisal did not take into account any so-called esthetic 
value or appearance (T.19) and that his appraisal reflected the average 
wholesale price of dealers throughout the country (T. 21). Vander Veer 1 
testified that there is no more certain way of establishing the value 
of a piece of jewelry than by appraisal by a competent appraiser 
(T. 23) and that although a dealer might sell an item above or below 
market value, appraised value means market value (T. 25-26). In fact, 
dealers differ so much in their approach to marketing that it is 
"almost impossible" to arrive at a retail value except by an appraisal 
which takes into account wholesale prices across the country (T. 17). 
Vander Veer also said he would insure the cross at the figure in his 
appraisal if he were insuring it for his wife or valuing it as part 
of an estate (T. 24). 
The conclusions of the expert appraiser were disputed by the 
appellant only through the testimony of Barry Nash, an employee of 
the appellant, who said that he "probably" could buy similar stones 
and compose a similar piece for between three and four thousand 
dollars and "probably" would be willing to sell it for approximately 
five thousand dollars (T. 36). However, Nash admitted that he was not 
qualified to appraise precious stones (T. 38-39); that he did not 
- 5 -
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attempt to appraise the jewelry in question, either before or af• 
it had been altered (T. 39); that it was he who selected Vandcr, 
to appraise the jewelry so that the appellant would know what it 
was worth ("[I] had it done becouse of some interest in the value 
the piece" (T. 37); and that it is an appraiser's joh to perfom 
tests on stones to determine their quality and, based on experi~ 
and knowledge of the market, establish a fair retail selling price, 
('1'. 43-44). And, although Nash testified that he would not keyst:I 
the jewelry in question and that he thought it would be difficult 
to get more than $5,000.00 for it in Salt Lake City, he could note/ 
that another jeweler in Salt Lake City would not keystone it or uJ 
I it wouldn't bring more than $5,000.00 elsewhere (T. 45). 1\hen a5 I 
whether he meant to represent that 0. C. Tanner, another Salt Lal·· 1 
Jeweler, is not keystoning $4,000.00 items, Nash replied: 
"I didn't say that. 
is not." (T. 47) 
I said, I would guess he, probably, 
Nash's testimony was equivocal, self-serving and lacking in 
foundation as to expertise. The testimony of Vander Veer, appclkj 
own choice as appraiser, \vas, by comparison, unequivocal, credit!.: 
based upon unquestioned professional expertise and provided t~ t·: 
court ample reasonable evidence in support of the award of $8, 180.~ 
the market, or replacement, value. Surely it cannot be said that 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the lower co' 
findings the damage award is "clearly against the weight of the 
evidence." Brown v. Board of Education of Morgan County School r· 
supra at 1131. Nor can it be saic1 that "the evidence is such tf,:· 
all rC'asonable minds would be persuaded to the contrary." !lcino•·, 
Ltd., v. Fields s~~ at 753. 
Appellant seems to infer that by replacement value, whicl. 
- 6 -
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'~'"qooSL'c: of tl1is uppc;\l hoth p,irl ic~3 a<Jrcc is synonymous with market 
v:iluc', rncuns the cost Lo the iJtJpcllant of purchi1sinc1 stones at less 
LJ1,rn wholc;;alc prices, munufacturincr a sirniLn piece of jewelry and 
milrkinCj it up by un ,:imount arbitrdrily fixed by the appellant. 
ilowever, it is clear that replacement value means the amount it would'* 
cost responde~ to replace the property. Furthermore, appellant's 
argument ignores the testimony of appellant's own witness, Mr. Nash, 
who testified that most jewelers determine for themselves what kind 
of profit margin they need on the sale of a piece and that "that margin 
v:oulcl vary, tremendously" (T. 29,34). That variation is the very reason 
why an appraisal is performed. In the words of Mr. Nash, "The ob-
jective of an appraisal would be to reflect what the value of an item 
would be, if it was to be sold in a jewelry store, or replaced for 
insurance purposes. . an appraisal [is] done to establish a retail 
price. (T. 34). As Nash stated, the value assigned by the 
appraiser" .should represent the average of what it would cost 
to replace the piece" (T. 33) This is precisely what the expert 
appraiser, H. J. Vander Veer, did in this case (T. 16). And this is 
why insurance companies rely upon appraisals to fix the replacement 
value of an item on which compensation is to be made (T. 12). Thus 
the testimony of appellant's own witness helped to demonstrate that 
in this case the appraisal value is the replacement value, which is 
the market value. 
Indeed, rather than excessive, Vander Veer's appraisal was 
probably on the short side. He testified that his appraisal did not 
tilke into account the je1·.'eler's" .overhead, his personnel, his 
fixccl costs, his profit margin, ;md all that. (T. 18). 
- 7 -
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~ I 
Appellant hu.s also mu.clc the bald iJ.s,;crtion that "rocc)\'~r 
be limited to the SiJ.lt LiJ.kc City retail jch·elry market" withoul 
providing any authority for thu.t proposition. The law is contrar 
Stoll v. Almon c. ,Judd Co., 106 Conn. 551, 1381\. 479, 483 ( 1927)' 
cited by appellant at page 9 of its brief, makes it clear that the I 
value to be recovered is the " .value in the market open to tt: 
plaintiff at the time of loss. " 'I'here is nothing in the law or ir, 1 
the record to limit the market open to respondent in this case ~ 
Salt Lake City alone. Such a limitation would be inappropriate 
in the case of jewelry, which can be easily moved from place to 
place for sale (T. 45, 46). The mL!rket open to respondent extendec I 
at least to cities elsewhere around the country. Vander Veer 1·1as 
familiar with prices elsewhere (T. 16,21), whereas there is no 
indication in the record that Nash possessed such knowledqe (T. C'.,I 
45). Vander Veer stated that his appraisal reflected wholesale ~1 
in Salt Lake City or elsewhere (T.12). 
The trier of fact has wide discretion as to the amount of 
damages awarded and an award will not be set aside as a matter o'i 
unless grossly and manifestly excessive. Amoss v. Broadbent, 514 ! 
I 
2d 1284, 1287 (Utah 1973); Ward ~Enevold, 504 P. 2d 1111,1114 1c1 
1972). In the instant case the trial court's award had substantic.I 
support in the record and was not excessive . 
THE APPRAISER'S TESTIMONY ON THE Ml\RKET VALUE OF THE JE\'iEL' 
HAD SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION. 
Appellant has challenged the qualifications of its own 
appraiser claiming that rlr. Vander Veer' s testimony as to the val.[ 
of the jewelry was received without prooer foundation regardin~ 
- 8 -
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his e:·:1•crlisc in lhc ~:alt Leibe; City r.·tail jeHelry market. 
It should be noted that no objection was made by appellant at 1· 
uial reqcirclinq the expert's qualificiltions as an appraiser. Indeed, 
it was appellant who selected this expert and submitted the jewelry 
to him in order to, in the words of appellant's employee and witness 
Nash, 11 • .establish a retail price. Vander Veer's testimony 
had a sufficient founclcttion. Ile testi fiecl that as of the time of the 
trial he had bc>en appraising jewelry for " .quite a few stores in 
tho [Salt Lake City] areil. . for six or seven years" (T. 9). He 
testified in detail concerning the method which he followed in 
appraising the stones in question (T. 11-12, 19-23), and stated 
repeatedly that all of his appraisals are rendered in terms of 
retail market values (T. 12,15,25). Vander Veer stated that he is 
himself a dealer in emeralds (T. 12) and in rendering appraisals takes 
into account ". .the value which is placed on stones by the Retail 
Jewelers Association, and groups at the Gemological Institute, in 
the material which they put out, which more or less, grades stones as 
to the color, the clarity, and the cut" (T. 16). 
Mr. Vander Veer was qualified as an expert appraiser with 
substantial knowledge and expertise in appraising the retail market 
value of precious stones in the Salt Lake City area or any area. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED RESPONDENT THE Ar10UN'l' REQUIRED TO 
RESTORE HER TO HER POSITION AT THE TIME OF THE LOSS. 
At Point IV of the appellant's brief appellant seems to argue 
that since the jewelry in question was a gjft to the respondent, an 
award of any dama0es to her for the loss of the jewelry would 
- 9 -
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constitute a windfall. It is well settled that the fundamental 
principle of damages for the loss of bailed property " . is tor 
the injured party to the position he would have been in had it not 
been for the wrong of the other pL1rty." Park v. Moorman Manufactc 
Company, supra at 920. Regardless of how respondent acquired the 
jewelry, she unquestionably was the O\·mer at the time of the loss. 
was damaged in the full amount of the market value of the jewelry 
at that time. The trial court's award was consistent with the pre: 
of market value and in no respect is a windfall profit to the 
respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
The weight of the evidence supported the trial court's finrfo1 
that the market value of the jewelry at the time of this loss was 
$8,180.00. The trial court properly awarded respondent that amoo~ 
in order to restore her to the position she would have been in ha; 
it not been for the wrongful loss of the jewelry by the appell~t. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respon:! 
- 10 -
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